For Nigeria, this is a moment of choice for both domestic leaders and international partners. Retreating from governance now may seem fiscally prudent, but it will be politically costly. The consequences are both everyday and structural – weaker institutions, deeper cynicism, and a democracy that exists more on paper than in practice. The work of salvaging governance and democracy in Nigeria demands not less funding, but better, braver, and more locally grounded funding.
Nigeria’s democracy is entering dangerous territory, with governance failures worsening. Donor support for transparency, accountability, and democracy programming is being withdrawn under the radar. Should Nigerians be worried? For nearly a decade, major donor-funded programmes supported efforts to improve transparency and accountability. Today, most have wound down or shifted course. MacArthur’s On Nigeria programme, arguably the most ambitious accountability-focused investment, ended at the end of 2024. Others, such as Luminate, Ford, Open Society, and FCDO, have also reduced or redirected their support, shrinking the pool of resources for work on corruption, civic space, and public sector reform.
The dismantling of USAID and sharp cuts to programmes across Africa in 2025 worsened the situation, sending a chilling signal that aid can be abruptly cut off for political reasons. The UK, for example, is reducing official development assistance to roughly 0.3 percent of national income over the next four to five years. Similar cuts are evident among European donors and multilateral agencies. In 2025, at least 17 EU member states cut aid, and 26 of 34 DAC states reduced their aid budgets. What this means is that the current distress in Nigeria’s governance sector is only the beginning; the full effects are still ahead. Governance and democracy work, often seen as politically sensitive compared to health or infrastructure, is especially vulnerable.
Yet African governments, including Nigeria’s, rarely invest meaningfully in citizen-led efforts to deepen democracy, strengthen civic education, or support independent media and watchdog groups. The people and institutions that make democratic accountability real often depend on external resources that are now disappearing, leaving democracy dangerously vulnerable. This pullback is unfolding as Nigeria’s governance indicators slide into the red zone. Civic space is under pressure, freedom of expression and access to information are contested, and corruption remains systemic. Political leadership remains organized around patronage and short-term power calculations. For many Nigerians, the promise of democracy has not translated into reliable public services, economic opportunity, or fair use of resources.
Donor fatigue for governance-related work is understandable. After decades of investment, it is hard to point to sweeping structural change. But governance reform does not move in straight lines, and it rarely fits neatly into a three to five-year project cycle. The answer to slow progress is not to exit. Instead, it is smarter, more politically aware, and more locally led support. Pulling back support for governance-related programmes at this critical time may end up much costlier for the future of democracy, risking past investments and deepening citizens’ distrust of both government and democracy itself.
While philanthropy and bilateral and multilateral agencies have the freedom to determine how to give, the exercise of that power carries significant responsibility. In Nigeria today, international aid must respond to urgent national needs. No need is greater than the role of philanthropy in democracy-building. Resources are needed to cultivate a new generation of democrats. Nigeria’s young population is politically aware yet increasingly disillusioned. Without deliberate efforts to strengthen civic education, nurture democratic values, and connect young people to decision-making, there is no guarantee that Nigeria’s future will be more democratic than its present.
Funding is also essential to slow and reverse the rollback of accountability. When civil society groups, investigative journalists, and public-interest lawyers lose funding, those who control public resources face less scrutiny. This shifts incentives within the state, making it easier to silence critics, normalize impunity, and treat public money as private spoils. This is already visible in Nigeria. Additionally, Nigeria needs investments that enable innovation, movement-building, and networked action. Past programmes have shown that real gains often come when organizations across sectors work together, linking communities, media, reformist bureaucrats, creatives, and activists around common agendas.
The end of USAID as the world knew it, the contraction of European aid, and the closure of major governance programmes have created a dangerous vacuum. If no new sources of support emerge soon—whether through reconfigured international partnerships, regional funds, African philanthropy, or domestic resource mobilization—the continent risks a wave of democratic erosion, leaving fewer defenders on the field. Governance funding should also intentionally support change champions within government and public institutions. Reform-minded officials often work with limited backing and face significant personal risk. When civil society and donors partner with them on open budgeting, procurement reforms, or digital transparency, the likelihood of lasting institutional change increases significantly.
What should replace the old model is a commitment to long-term partnership with Nigerian actors as agenda-setters. That means more core funding, longer time horizons, and a clearer focus on building resilient institutions and citizens’ movements, rather than chasing short-term visibility. It also means being honest about politics: governance work is about who holds power, how they are constrained, and whether citizens can shape the rules. For Nigeria, this is a moment of choice. Retreating from governance now may seem fiscally prudent, but it will be politically costly. The consequences are both everyday and structural – weaker institutions, deeper cynicism, and a democracy that exists more on paper than in practice. The work of salvaging governance and democracy demands not less funding, but better, braver, and more locally grounded funding.
