On Saturday, February 25, 2023, Nigerians will vote to choose the successor to President Muhammadu Buhari. This election marks the seventh consecutive presidential cycle since the country returned to civilian rule in May 1999 and the tenth since the presidential system was introduced in 1979. Nigeria’s experience with presidential democracy has never been smooth. The first ballot, supervised by the military in August 1979, installed Shehu Shagari as the nation’s first elected president, but the result was soon taken to the Supreme Court, beginning a pattern that the *Economist* later described as “democracy by court orders.” Four years later, on the last day of December 1983, soldiers led by Major‑General Muhammadu Buhari overthrew the government only three months after Shagari’s re‑election. After a decade of military rule, the 1993 election won by businessman Moshood Abiola was nullified by General Ibrahim Babangida, leading to another six‑year hiatus before electoral legitimacy was restored.
Since the return to civilian rule, the credibility of elections has been uneven. The nadir came in 2007, when INEC chairman Maurice Iwu, in collusion with outgoing President Olusegun Obasanjo, fabricated results to install Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The election, described by *Foreign Affairs* as “excessively rigged,” prompted Yar’Adua to launch an inquiry chaired by former Chief Justice Mohammed Uwais. The panel uncovered a twin culture of violence and rigging that has long undermined political legitimacy in Nigeria. Subsequent reforms have yielded only modest gains. In 2011, new INEC chairman Attahiru Jega introduced a baseline voter register and permanent voter cards, halving the number of elections that ended up before petition tribunals. By 2015, the presidential election went unchallenged, and for the first time in history, fewer than 50 % of contested seats were taken to court. However, many of these advances were eroded under the current INEC leadership, leading to a resurgence of election petitions in 2019.
The 2023 election is arguably the most unique in Nigeria’s history. First, it will be the first presidential vote in which the military does not feature on the ballot or in the background. Buhari, a retired two‑star general, is term‑limited and will leave office in May 2023, ending nearly six decades of uninterrupted military dominance in the country’s public sphere. His departure could signal a shift toward more deliberative, civilian‑led solutions to nation‑building, moving away from the “gun‑barrel” approaches of the past. Second, for the first time in a quarter of a century, the leading presidential candidate will not be a soldier, and for the first time in two decades Buhari will not be on the ballot. Observers have long wondered whether Buhari’s cult following in the North will find a new home; the upcoming contest in the North‑West and North‑East will likely determine the answer and could prove decisive if the vote is credible.
Third, the three main candidates each hail from one of Nigeria’s three major regions—East, West, and North—re‑introducing the original fault lines that existed at independence. This tri‑podal configuration may challenge the country to imagine pathways beyond traditional regional fissures. Fourth, polling has entered the campaign narrative in a way never seen before, yet the methodology of many surveys is questionable. One poll reported that 53 % of respondents were undecided or refused to disclose their intentions; another sampled only 2,384 smartphone owners in a nation where roughly 44 % possess such devices; a third predicted a presidential run‑off despite high levels of indecision. These examples suggest that sampling biases and uneven quality have limited the reliability of poll results.
Fifth, INEC plans to use the Bi‑Modal Voter Accreditation System (B‑VAS) to address Nigeria’s history of “data‑free” voting. The device accredits voters, counts ballots, and can transmit results digitally to a central collation centre. However, its effectiveness depends on broadband infrastructure, which is lacking in nearly half of the country. In areas without reliable connectivity, results would still need secure physical transport, raising doubts about B‑VAS as a panacea for electoral malpractice.
Beyond these factors, widespread violence continues to mar campaigning, threatening the safety of voting, counting, and collation in many regions. President Buhari’s insistence that the Central Bank’s currency reform persist throughout the election season adds another layer of uncertainty. The vote will occur amid hardship and restiveness, and the candidate who can survive the “starvation of cash” may ultimately be declared the winner.
Prof. Odinkalu, teacher and lawyer, can be reached via.
Comments are closed for this story.