Iran’s atomic energy chief has linked the potential dilution of its highly enriched uranium stockpile to the complete lifting of international sanctions, reopening a key point of contention in long-stalled nuclear negotiations. The proposal from Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), suggests a possible pathway to reduce the most sensitive part of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, though he did not specify whether this includes all unilateral U.S. measures or broader international restrictions.
Speaking to reporters, Eslami indicated Tehran might consider diluting its 60% enriched uranium—material that is close to weapons-grade—if “all sanctions would be lifted in return.” This marks a notable, albeit conditional, flexibility on the U.S. demand for Iran to end enrichment entirely, a step Washington has long sought to prevent any pathway to nuclear weapons. Iran consistently maintains its program is for civilian purposes only. The statement followed remarks by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who categorically rejected any “zero enrichment” outcome, stating that such a demand “can never be accepted by us.” Araghchi framed Iran’s insistence on maintaining enrichment as rooted in national “independence and dignity,” not merely technical or economic needs.
The divergent signals from senior officials highlight the internal consensus in Tehran on keeping enrichment capabilities while leaving room for potential trade-offs on stockpile limits. This stance complicates efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), from which the U.S. withdrew in 2018 and which originally capped enrichment at 3.67%. The comments come amid heightened regional tensions, including recent U.S. military deployments and threats of force, following a 12-day war between Iran and Israel last year that included strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Both sides claim the attack caused minimal or significant damage respectively.
Indirect talks mediated by Oman have recently resumed, with Iran describing the contacts as “a good start.” However, the fundamental gap over enrichment appears wide. Eslami’s conditional offer on dilution contrasts sharply with Araghchi’s non-negotiable position on enrichment, suggesting any future agreement must reconcile these positions. The significance lies in whether Iran’s willingness to address the 60% stockpile—a major proliferation concern—is sufficient to unlock comprehensive sanctions relief, or if the U.S. will insist on deeper restrictions. The outcome will likely depend on the balance between verifiable limits on weapons-breakout potential and Iran’s demand for sanctions removal, within a context of persistent mutual distrust and regional volatility.
