A grainy 90-second video surfaced on TikTok in February, showing kidnapped women and children from the village of Woro in Kwara State. The clip, posted by a handler using the name Abu Muhammad Abba, mocked the Nigerian government for downplaying the number of victims abducted by the Sadiku-led Boko Haram faction a week earlier. Within hours, the account vanished, likely deactivated or the content removed. But a recent check revealed it had resurfaced, now pumping out propaganda sermons from late Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf.
This wasn’t just a propaganda stunt. It was a stark glimpse into a global crisis: extremist groups exploiting digital platforms and weak governance systems to recruit, radicalize, and project power far beyond physical battlefields. At the core of this challenge lies Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI)—the systems enabling secure digital identity, payments, and communications. While DPI is often hailed as a tool for financial inclusion and economic growth, security experts argue it’s becoming a critical national security battleground.
As governments digitize services and expand connectivity, terrorist groups have grown adept at hijacking the same ecosystem. The TikTok video from Woro wasn’t just a message; it was a sign of terrorism’s evolution in the digital age. From the Islamic State’s sophisticated media machine to al-Qaeda’s Telegram channels and violent far-right networks in Europe and North America, extremists have turned social media into strategic assets, according to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. “The war is not about guns and bullets again,” says Malik Samuel, a security analyst at Good Governance Africa. “It’s now information warfare.”
In West Africa, where Islamic State and al-Qaeda franchises wreak havoc in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, regional efforts like the Multinational Joint Task Force have focused on ground operations. But in Europe, agencies like Europol have dismantled entire online propaganda infrastructures—targeting servers, websites, and communication systems, not just individual posts. Yet TikTok’s explosive growth has opened new doors. An Institute for Strategic Dialogue report, “CaliphateTok,” found at least 20 Islamic State-supporting accounts amassing over a million views. Europol’s 2023 operation with TikTok identified more than 2,100 pieces of terrorist content across 11 countries.
Nigeria isn’t isolated from these trends. The country has invested heavily in digital identity systems like the National Identification Number (NIN) and Bank Verification Number (BVN). But questions linger: has equal investment gone into securing this ecosystem against emerging threats? Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, ISWAP, once relied on clandestine websites and intermediaries. Now, platforms like TikTok let them bypass gatekeepers, communicating directly with followers, recruits, and even the state.
TikTok’s algorithm-driven design amplifies content rapidly. A single video, even if removed, can be downloaded and reshared across multiple accounts, creating a ripple effect. Content moderation becomes reactive while dissemination remains proactive. Joseph Ekong, a researcher at Stakeholder Democracy Network, says Nigeria must treat early-warning and early-response systems as public infrastructure, not ad-hoc donor projects.
The use of TikTok initially spread among bandits with no clear political motive. But Boko Haram factions have adopted the tactic. Researcher Bulama Bukarti warned on X: “It started with bandits. Now, Boko Haram members are hosting live TikTok shows—spreading propaganda, justifying violence, and threatening anyone who speaks against them.” He noted some pre-recorded videos have hundreds of thousands of views, adding, “At this rate, it’s only a matter of time before they start livestreaming attacks.”
Nigeria’s response has been uneven. Responsibility for digital security is scattered across law enforcement, intelligence, and regulators. There’s no public information about a dedicated framework for tracking extremist content in real time. The National Counter Terrorism Centre didn’t respond to requests for comment, but Director-General Adamu Laka said last year the government partners with social media platforms to remove terrorist-linked accounts. TikTok’s transparency portal shows Nigeria made 33 takedown requests between January 2023 and mid-2025, with 30 acted upon.
But experts argue account removals alone aren’t enough. Samuel suggests engaging credible clerics and community voices to offer alternative narratives on the same platforms. Automated moderation tools struggle with local languages, and human capacity for African content remains limited. He recommends collaborating with indigenous tech companies with stronger cultural understanding.
The risk extends to recruitment. Short-form videos can normalize extremist ideas among younger users, who make up a significant portion of TikTok’s Nigerian audience. Unlike traditional recruitment requiring physical networks, digital pathways are diffuse and harder to detect. A user might follow a handle and gradually be drawn into encrypted spaces.
At the heart of the issue is a digital governance gap. Nigeria has laws like the Cybercrimes Act and Terrorism Prevention Act, but they aren’t designed for the speed and scale of platforms like TikTok. Implementation is fragmented, coordination weak, and technical capacity limited. “Without systems to monitor, analyze, and respond to online threats in a coordinated manner, the state remains a step behind,” Ekong says.
