In May 2013 the M23 rebel group surrendered to a multinational onslaught in eastern Congo‑Kinshasa, and the Congolese National Armed Forces (FARDC) reinforced their positions around Goma on 21 May. A decade later, history appears to be repeating itself as a new regional force attempts to push back a resurgent M23.
The conflict in the Great Lakes region has deep roots and is driven by multiple factors: the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) weak state capacity, reflected in incomplete territorial control and the presence of numerous domestic and foreign armed groups; Rwanda’s extraterritorial military operations; ambiguous bilateral relations between Uganda and Rwanda; trans‑border economic interests in a largely informal and criminalised environment; and ethnic loyalties that cross national borders. Since the Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in 1994, relations with the DRC have been largely conflictual. Rwanda invaded its large but fragile neighbour twice, in 1996 and 1998, each time hiding behind a Congolese rebel proxy. After officially withdrawing its troops in 2003, Kigali continued to operate covertly, supporting armed groups in eastern DRC—first the CNDP and later the M23. Strong international pressure forced Rwanda to cease its support for the M23 in 2013, leading to the rebel’s defeat by a Force International Brigade deployed alongside the FARDC and the UN peacekeeping mission. Rwanda’s presence had been accompanied by grave human‑rights abuses and the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources.
Bilateral relations improved after Félix Tshisekedi became DRC president in 2019, but the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) remained present in North Kivu, an accusation Kigali denied. The M23 re‑emerged with Rwandan support in November 2021. Tshisekedi’s invitation to the Ugandan army to operate on Congolese territory against the Allied Democratic Forces—originally a Ugandan rebel group that had long been active across the border—angered Rwanda, which was not consulted and resented Ugandan troops in what it considers its backyard. In March 2022, M23 elements attacked Congolese army positions, and the situation escalated further when, on 12 June, the Congolese government formally summoned Rwanda to cease its support for the M23 and refrain from any actions jeopardising regional peace and stability. The next day the M23 seized Bunagana, a key trading centre on the DRC‑Uganda border.
The UN Group of Experts on the DRC validated Congolese accusations against Rwanda. Its public report of 14 June found that Rwanda and Uganda had provided rear bases and other support to the M23. A leaked confidential update in July was even more explicit, documenting “military operations by the RDF on Congolese territory and support by the RDF to M23 operations” and expressing concern over rising hate speech, hostility and violence against Rwandophone populations in eastern DRC. In September, President Tshisekedi addressed the UN General Assembly, accusing Rwanda of “direct military aggression” and “occupation” of DRC territory. The expulsion of the Rwandan ambassador to the DRC on 30 October 2022 marked a new low in bilateral relations.
Regional leaders sought to contain a crisis that threatened peace and embarrassed the East African Community (EAC), of which both the DRC and Rwanda are members (the DRC joined the EAC the day after the March M23/Rwanda attack). Two peace initiatives were launched: one led by Angolan President João Lourenço on behalf of the African Union, and another by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta on behalf of the EAC. Kenya subsequently assumed the lead both politically and militarily. Politically, Kenyatta engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy as the EAC mediator; militarily, an EAC regional force (EACRF) led by Kenya began deployment in November.
These developments unfolded as Rwanda faced increasing international condemnation. The massacre of more than a hundred civilians by the M23 in Kishishe at the end of November drew worldwide outrage toward the rebel group and its alleged Rwandan backers. Despite Rwanda’s continued denial, a December UN Group of Experts report detailed RDF interventions on DRC territory, prompting near‑unanimous condemnation from the United States, the European Union and France. The United Kingdom remained silent, likely to avoid jeopardising its controversial migration deal with Rwanda. The 2022 Bertelsmann Transformation Index stressed that regional stability is essential for democratic progress in the DRC, urging international partners to pressure neighbouring states to enable peaceful electoral transitions and break the cycle of power consolidation.
Kenyatta’s optimism that the 6 December 2022 peace talks would herald a new era proved short‑lived. Successive cease‑fire agreements collapsed, and M23 offensives continue. The deployment of the EACRF, regional diplomatic efforts and international pressure on Rwanda have not halted the fighting, which has produced dramatic humanitarian consequences. Angola’s announcement on 11 March that it would deploy troops to “support the army and regional forces” may further complicate the situation and internationalise the conflict.
The evolution may yet echo the 2012‑2013 experience, when combined international pressure on Rwanda and the deployment of an international force ended the M23 rebellion. Ten years ago that mix of political and military measures failed to produce a lasting solution, and it remains to be seen whether the lesson will finally be learned. Extreme state weakness in the DRC compounds the violence that has plagued the Great Lakes region for three decades. After decades of decay, rebuilding the DRC will be a colossal task; without genuine state reconstruction, development and lasting peace in the region will remain illusory.
*Filip Reyntjens is Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics at the University of Antwerp.*
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