Bola Ahmed Tinubu is set to be sworn in as president on 29 May 2023, provided the courts uphold his election victory. He won the highly contested 25 February presidential election with 37 % of the total votes, but at least two leading opposition candidates have filed separate legal challenges to the results.
The new president will inherit a country beset by insecurity. Armed conflicts, organized crime and worsening food insecurity affect every region. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that about three million Nigerians have been internally displaced by violence. Nigeria’s geographical zones are associated with distinct ethnic and religious groups, each experiencing different forms of insecurity: farmer‑herder clashes in the middle belt, insurgency in the north‑east, banditry in the north‑west, and separatist violence in the south‑east.
Our research on communal conflict in Northern Nigeria, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Kenya, as well as our community‑development work, leads us to conclude that Tinubu’s presidency could heighten tensions in the central and south‑east regions while potentially reducing violence in the north. Nigeria’s sociopolitical environment is characterised by strong patronage networks, and ethnic and religious identities often overlap, reinforcing political cleavages. Perceived exclusion of any religion or ethnic group can quickly spark violent ethno‑religious crises.
Tinubu’s unprecedented choice of a fellow Muslim, Kashim Shettima, as vice‑president is likely to increase ethnic and religious tensions in the north‑central zone. Allegations of discrimination against Igbos in Lagos could fuel Biafra‑related activism and violence in the south‑east. Conversely, his promises to create more employment opportunities and establish civilian neighbourhood‑watch groups hold potential for reducing Boko Haram activity and banditry in the north‑east and north‑west.
In the north‑central region, Tinubu’s administration is expected to confront escalating farmer‑herder conflicts, which are deeply intertwined with ethnic and religious tensions. The “Muslim‑Muslim” ticket—Tinubu, a south‑west Muslim, and Shettima, a north‑east Muslim—breaks with the post‑1999 practice of semi‑official power‑sharing along religious and ethnic lines to manage sectarian sentiment. Although Nigeria is a secular state with roughly equal Muslim and Christian populations, the Christian Association of Nigeria has denounced the ticket, and religious mobilisation was evident throughout the campaign. Tinubu secured the most votes and met the constitutional requirement of at least 25 % of the vote in 25 of Nigeria’s 36 states, indicating a nationwide appeal, yet the perception of a Muslim‑Muslim ticket may deepen religious polarisation and hinder the government’s ability to address communal violence.
In the south‑east, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) are likely to continue agitating for independence, protesting the marginalisation of the Igbo. Although the presidential candidate Peter Obi, an Igbo, enjoys strong youth support in southern Nigeria and his allies discouraged sabotage of the election, his third‑place finish—amid logistical challenges, allegations of voter suppression and ethnic profiling of Igbos in Lagos—may intensify Biafra‑related activism. During the campaign, Tinubu pledged to negotiate with IPOB, a departure from Buhari’s treatment of the group as a terrorist organisation.
In the north‑east, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa are expected to challenge the new administration, as they did under Buhari and Goodluck Jonathan. Tinubu frames the insurgency as a security problem rooted in socioeconomic crisis, calling for job creation and a revamp of the security architecture. However, his manifesto is silent on the reintegration of former Boko Haram members. Tinubu previously advocated amnesty for insurgents in 2013, and his vice‑president‑elect Shettima has also called for amnesty, suggesting the programme may continue. A 2022 Buhari‑initiated “Operation Safe Corridor” for surrendering militants reportedly reduced Boko Haram’s fighting force, and recent surveys indicate growing public receptivity to the return of former insurgents.
In the north‑west, bandit militias continue kidnapping for ransom, stealing cattle and killing civilians. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset records over 2 600 civilian deaths in 2021, a sharp rise from 2020. These groups lack a clear political aim; the conflict began as a land dispute between Hausa farmers and Fulani herders and has been linked to climate‑change impacts. Buhari, a Fulani, designated the militias as terrorist organisations in January 2022 and deployed the military, but subsequent air raids have often killed civilians. Unlike Buhari’s approach, Tinubu advocates engagement with violence‑affected communities and emphasises civilian neighbourhood‑watch groups to combat banditry. It remains unclear whether these groups will focus on non‑violent conflict resolution or devolve into armed vigilantism, which research on civilian defence militias in the Boko Haram conflict suggests could exacerbate violence.
**Way forward**
The new administration faces enormous challenges in addressing widespread armed conflict and deep societal divisions. Effective lawmaking and law enforcement are essential to tackle the root causes of insecurity, such as poverty and unemployment. Ensuring ethnic and religious balance in key security appointments could reduce tensions and facilitate dialogue with community leaders and religious associations.
*Jana Krause, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo*
*Imrana Buba, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of Oslo*
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