Sahel Region Faces Greater Risk of Fragmentation Than Jihadist Rule
Despite a surge in terrorist attacks in the Sahel region, experts warn that the area is more likely to experience fragmentation than fall under centralized jihadist control. Recent attacks by Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have raised concerns about the potential for a Sahelian capital to be taken over by jihadist forces.
However, there are key differences between the situation in the Sahel and the 2024 capture of Damascus by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Unlike HTS, JNIM and ISGS do not appear to be seeking to seize power in the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey, or Ouagadougou. Instead, their strategies focus on eroding state authority in rural areas, where they mediate local conflicts, enforce norms, and collect taxes.
The capabilities of JNIM and ISGS are also limited compared to those of HTS. They operate primarily in remote rural areas, using light weapons and relying on mobility and local knowledge rather than firepower and logistical capabilities. While they have taken control of towns in the interior, they lack the capacity to sustain a prolonged siege and occupation of a major city.
In contrast to the situation in Syria, where the fall of Damascus was facilitated by a decade of conflict, widespread defections, and deteriorating living standards, the Sahel region has a different geopolitical landscape. There is no declared international effort to topple the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and the capabilities of the armies in these countries are increasing.
The rise of hardline Islamist ideologies in urban centers has not translated to widespread support for jihadist groups in the capital cities, where public sentiment remains hostile towards them. The capture and sustained control of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces is therefore unlikely, and JNIM and ISGS are likely to restrict themselves to guerrilla and destabilization tactics.
However, this does not mean that the region is immune to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup and the 2022 Burkina Faso coup were both triggered by military setbacks and escalating casualties among security forces. Further upheavals leading to institutional breakdowns and a disorganization of security forces cannot be ruled out, with unpredictable consequences for the Sahel and West Africa at large.
To avoid this, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) governments must acknowledge the limitations of their militarized approach to terrorism. While increasing troop numbers and acquiring advanced weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures have not incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the world’s epicenter for terrorism, accounting for half of all global casualties.
A coherent, region-wide counter-terrorism strategy that goes beyond military interventions is needed. Valuable insights can be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin’s disengagement and reintegration programs, Mauritania’s religious dialogue initiatives, and Algeria’s non-kinetic approach. Engaging with communities stigmatized by counter-terrorism operations and fostering trust can also reduce the risk of recruitment into armed groups.
Without a meaningful recalibration of strategy, the Sahel could descend into prolonged fragmentation, with profound consequences for West Africa’s stability. As experts warn, the region’s future hangs in the balance, and a new approach is urgently needed to address the complex and evolving threat posed by jihadist groups.
