Problems with the reintegration of former Boko Haram members make preventing violent extremism and organised crime difficult. Former fighters who return to communities in Cameroon pose a significant security threat to civilians. The lack of effective reintegration increases the chances of ex‑combatants returning to violence, encouraged by the rise in lucrative organised crime, the circulation of illicit weapons and inter‑communal conflicts.
The first step in successful reintegration is the screening of defectors, but this process is lacking in Cameroon. The roles of Boko Haram associates who surrender are not clearly defined, making it hard to distinguish between fighters, hostages, couriers, slaves or logisticians. Without this distinction, those who remain radicalised and dangerous cannot be identified. For example, community sources in Amchidé near the Nigerian border told ISS Today that former combatants sometimes threatened civilians.
A National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (CNDDR) was created in 2018, yet the law establishing it does not mention those kidnapped by Boko Haram. Hostages who escape and return home are often mistaken for ex‑combatants. Managers at the Méri disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration centre in northern Cameroon say the facility houses both former hostages and fighters. Consequently, legal gaps and the lack of screening hinder the resolution of the problem.
Deficiencies in the reintegration process are detrimental to those who leave violent extremist groups. Former associates can face reprisals from Boko Haram’s victims because no prosecutions or reconciliation have taken place to prove their innocence or guilt. Innocent former members have been stigmatised in Mayo Moskota, and there is a lack of clarity around prosecuting Boko Haram fighters, even though the Lake Chad Basin Regional Stabilisation Strategy and international standards address this. Prosecution is important for reintegration, as it helps counter impunity and allay the fears of victims. Yet, since the Méri centre opened in 2020, no residents have been pardoned, exonerated or convicted of a terrorist act before being reintegrated into the community.
The lack of infrastructure means many Boko Haram defectors integrate directly into communities, highlighting another problem: the absence of legal harmonisation in Cameroon. The 2014 law imposing the death penalty on anyone found guilty of, or complicit in, acts of terrorism does not promote reintegration, and the CNDDR decree is silent on amnesty or legal proceedings against former fighters. Cantonment centres—where returnees stay before reintegration—are also lacking. Méri’s secondary prison was transformed into a deradicalisation centre, but although it has space for only 150 residents, it houses over 2 500, according to the CNDDR, and lacks training materials to facilitate economic integration.
A regional cantonment centre should be built in Mémé, in the commune of Mora, which has been declared the regional CNDDR headquarters for the Far North. In 2021, the communes of Mora, Mayo Moskota, Kolofata, Mokolo, Makari, Waza, Logone‑Birni and Fotokol alone were home to 584 former fighters and members; that number has since increased. Community sources say over 100 former fighters and members have returned to Boko Haram. Many former combatants also live among internally displaced persons in Zamaï, making them vulnerable to reprisals from victims or attacks by insurgents who consider them traitors.
National guidance on reintegrating former members is essential. In 2017, the Far North Region governor encouraged Boko Haram fighters to defect, offering an outreach programme and a three‑part protocol involving screening, deradicalisation and reintegration. Defectors pledged to abandon all interaction with Boko Haram, swearing on the Koran in the presence of community members and traditional and religious authorities. This initiative faded when the CNDDR was created, but its achievements and lessons should inform ongoing reintegration processes.
Community sources report that over 100 former fighters and members—disillusioned by their treatment at the Méri centre or left unmonitored in communities—have returned to Boko Haram since leader Abubakar Shekau died in 2021. Poor conditions at the Méri centre also deter many fighters from surrendering.
In the absence of successful reintegration, terrorism continues in the region, while armed robbery, hostage‑taking and road ambushes are rising. Weapons circulate, increasing insecurity and fuelling community conflicts. Reintegration is vital to reduce the threat of violent extremism and mitigate the upswing of organised crime linked to former Boko Haram associates in communities. A clear process must be defined, including steps, objectives, outcomes and indicators. An inclusive, transitional‑justice approach should involve local communities, traditional leaders, community‑based organisations, the media, researchers and the private sector. Counter‑terrorism legislation must also be harmonised at the national and regional levels, guided by the principles for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the Lake Chad Basin Regional Stabilisation Strategy.
Célestin Delanga, Research Officer, ISS Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.
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