Nigeria’s Lakurawa: Why a Hybrid Jihadist-Criminal Group Demands a Sustained Response
Sporadic airstrikes, including a major U.S. strike on Christmas Day 2025, have inflicted casualties on the Lakurawa militant group but are insufficient to halt its rapid transnational expansion across West Africa, security analysts warn. A sustained strategy combining precise military action with regional cooperation and community-focused programmes is required to dismantle the organisation.
Nigeria officially designated Lakurawa as a terrorist group in January 2025. The group first gained notoriety for deadly attacks in northwestern Nigeria in 2024, with nearly 100 people killed between November 2024 and September 2025, mostly civilians. The U.S. airstrikes in Sokoto State targeted Lakurawa bases; while official assessments are pending, sources with direct access report at least 136 fighters killed, dozens injured, and 200 missing.
However, analysts from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) stress that degrading Lakurawa requires more than isolated strikes. The group must be prevented from regrouping and exploiting border regions with Niger and Benin. Effective countermeasures need joint local prevention and suppression efforts from all affected states.
Lakurawa is distinct from conventional jihadist groups, operating as a hybrid organisation that merges religious extremism with organised crime. This model fuels its expansion and draws membership from Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Chad, and Burkina Faso. Originating near the Nigeria-Niger border in 2018, it initially presented itself as a protector against bandits before turning insurgent, exploiting weak state presence to establish parallel governance, levy taxes, and enforce strict religious codes in villages.
The group’s leadership, under Amir Tajudeen, moves across the central Sahel, underscoring its multinational nature. Financially, Lakurawa has evolved from extorting farmers and herders under the guise of zakat (alms) to relying heavily on kidnapping for ransom—a tactic shared with Boko Haram factions and criminal bandits. Evidence of operational ties emerged after the November 2025 abduction of schoolchildren in Borgu, an attack reminiscent of Boko Haram’s Chibok kidnapping.
With an estimated 2,000 members and fast-growing ranks, Lakurawa also employs co-option strategies, such as urging notorious bandit leaders to abandon crime. Following intensified Nigerian military operations from late 2025, the group is reportedly seeking reinforcements from the Sahel, while local extortion and violence continue.
To defeat Lakurawa, experts recommend a multi-pronged approach. Regional security cooperation must be revitalised, particularly between Nigeria and Niger, and Niger and Benin, overcoming political tensions that hinder intelligence sharing and joint operations. Military action should target leadership and logistics, paired with a credible disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme for lower-level fighters.
Critically, community engagement is essential. Responses must address the socio-economic and governance voids that allow Lakurawa to gain local legitimacy. Empowering traditional and religious leaders, improving state protection, and countering extremist narratives are vital to breaking the cycle of community dependence on the group.
The full ISS report, Lakurawa – a hybrid jihadi-criminal group on Nigeria’s fragile borderlands, details these dynamics. Without a coordinated, sustained effort that combines force with political and social solutions, Lakurawa’s hybrid model poses a persistent and evolving threat to regional stability.
